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I. INTRODUCTION
West Virginia is a hellhole. You didn't know? According to the Ameri-
can Tort Reform Association, a special interest group aimed at promoting busi-
ness interests, West Virginia is a "judicial hellhole" because of recent decisions
that are more "consumer friendly" than "corporate friendly." I This characteriza-
tion can be partially attributed to recent changes in West Virginia's class action
jurisprudence.
These changes were set in motion in 1998, when the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals amended Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, making it nearly identical to the 1966 version of Rule 23 of the Fed-
'Judicial Hellhole' Label Not Unfair, THE INTELLIGENCER WHEELrNG NEWS-REGISTER, Nov.
9, 2003, at C4 (criticizing the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' stance on medical moni-
toring relief).
2 The 1998 amendment to West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 23 significantly changed the
certification requirements for class actions in West Virginia. West Virginia Rule of Civil Proce-
dure subsections 23(a) and (b), which are the relevant sections for the purposes of this article, now
read as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen-
tative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the rep-
resentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) Inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) Adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individ-
ual members, and that a class action is superior to other available meth-
ods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters
pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy al-
ready commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirabil-
ity or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure.3 This amendment presented a challenge to West
Virginia attorneys, as well as circuit courts, because most of the court's deci-
sions interpreting the prior version of Rule 23 were rendered either partially or
totally obsolete. Although there is much case law interpreting the substantially
similar Federal Rule, the West Virginia court is not bound to interpret its Rule in
the same manner.5 Recently, the court made this point abundantly clear in a
landmark decision, In re West Virginia Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison.
6
This opinion by the Supreme Court of Appeals is significant for many
reasons. For the first time since the 1998 amendment to Rule 23, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has thoroughly discussed and defined class certification
requirements under the amended Rule.7 It is also the first time that the Supreme
Court of Appeals certified a products liability class action, 8 which is a signifi-
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the man-
agement of a class action.
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23.
3 See FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY, ROBIN J. DAVIS & Louis J. PALMER, LITIGATION HANDBOOK
ON WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 446 n.423 (2002). See infra note 70 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the former West Virginia Rule 23. Federal Rule Civil Procedure
23 was amended on December 1, 2003. See infra note 186 and accompanying text to review the
recent changes to FED. R. Civ. P. 23. West Virginia has not adopted the 2003 amendment to
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23.
4 in re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 64 n.8 (W. Va. 2003).
The version of Rule 23 that was discussed by the Court in
Burks v. Wymer was based upon the 1938 version of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... [w]hile the
factors outlined in Burks v. Wymer remain helpful to
courts evaluating the propriety of motions for class certifi-
cation, we no longer believe they are sufficient under our
current version of Rule 23.
Id.
5 "Although we may look to federal decisions for guidance in interpreting our civil rules...
we are by no means bound by those decisions." Brooks v. Isinghood, 584 S.E.2d 531, 538 (W.
Va. 2003) (quoting Darling v. Champion Home Builders Co., 638 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Wash. 1982)).
6 585 S.E.2d at 52. Rezulin is the trade name for the drug troglitazone, an oral drug that was
developed to treat Type 1I (adult onset) diabetes. Id. at 58. After its approval in early 1997 by the
Food and Drug Administration, the drug was marketed and sold by the defendants, Warner-
Lambert Company and Parke-Davis & Company, from February 1997 until March 2000, at which
time the defendants voluntarily withdrew the drug from the marketplace. Id. at 58-59. The pro-
posed class consisted of "all persons who either consumed the drug Rezulin in West Virginia or
consumed the drug Rezulin after having had the drugs prescribed or sold to them in West Vir-
ginia" alleged an increased risk of liver injury and that the defendants knowingly marketed a
defective product. Id. at 60.
7 See id. at 64-67. Section III, subsection C and D of the Court's opinion discusses the certi-
fication requirements under the amended West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b). Id.
8 The list is rather long of cases that have denied class certification in drug and medical de-
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cant departure from prior West Virginia case law, which did not permit drug and
medical device class actions. 9 Since Rezulin, the Court has further interpreted
West Virginia's Rule 23 on two occasions: first, in Ways v. Imation Enterprises
Corp.,10 and thereafter in Love v. Georgia-Pacfic Corp.11 The latter two cases
do not have as much of an impact on West Virginia's class action jurisprudence
as Rezulin, but they do help shape West Virginia's evolving class action device.
Therefore, Love and Ways will not be discussed in this Note to the same extent
as Rezulin.
The primary focus of this Note is the development of West Virginia's
class action jurisprudence. While the court has answered several questions by
setting forth some clear guidelines in recent decisions, it has also headed down
some undesirable paths, creating uncertainty along the way. This is a crucial
period for interpreting West Virginia's Rule 23; therefore, it must be done with
care, and with one eye on the future.
Part 1I of this Note addresses "the good" aspects of West Virginia's
class action system and how Rezulin has improved the certification process.
Particularly, it looks at how the court has set clear boundaries for the circuit
court in the certification of class actions and the importance of these boundaries.
Part III examines "the bad" aspects of Rezulin and its progeny. This sec-
tion discusses how the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has failed to
give the appropriate amount of deference to the circuit court in deciding whether
certification is appropriate. In its recent cases the West Virginia Supreme Court
has set forth an abuse of discretion standard of review but has not adhered to it.
This will be demonstrated by reviewing the findings of the Circuit Court of Ra-
leigh County in Rezulin and the findings of the Circuit Court of Fayette County
in Love.
vice class actions. See, e.g., Rose v. Medtronics, Inc., 107 Cal. App. 3d 150, 166 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980) (denying class action for allegedly defective pacemakers); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394
S.W.2d 1369 (I11. App. Ct. 979) (denying class action on behalf of daughters allegedly harmed by
their mothers' ingestion of the drug diethylstilbestrol); Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 2001 WL 34010613
(D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (denying medical monitoring relief).
9 In 1982, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Burks v. Wymer specifically re-
jected class actions in drug and medical device cases stating: "[s]tate and federal courts have
concurred in judging certain factual settings inappropriate for class action treatment." 307 S.E.2d
647, 650 (W. Va. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 64. "Proposed
classes composed of persons alleged to have been injured by improper medical treatment have
generally been rejected by the courts." Id. The Court in Burks went on to discuss the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in the Dalkon Shield litigation and quoted from its opinion: "No single happening
or accident occurs to cause similar types of physical harm or property damage." Id No one set of
operative facts establishes liability. No single proximate cause applies equally to each potential
class member and each defendant." Id. (quoting In re Northern Dist. of California Dalkon Shield
IUD Products Liab. Litig. v. A. H. Robbins Co., 693 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1982)).
to 589 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 2003).
1 590 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2003).
[Vol. 107
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Part IV focuses on an ambiguity in Rezulin that the court needs to ad-
dress. Virtually all commentators agree that it is not proper to certify a class
action under 23(b)(2) if 23(b)(3) is applicable. 2 If the reader is already ac-
quainted with Rezulin he or she may be asking at this point, "Didn't the West
Virginia Supreme Court certify a class under both 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)?" This
question will be addressed, as well as how the supreme court of appeals should
remedy this potential problem.
II. THE GOOD: CLEAR BOUNDARIES FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT AT THE
CERTIFICATION STAGE
A. Evidentiary Hearings on the Issue of Certification Under Burks v. Wy-
mer
It is common practice for a circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hear-
ing on the issue of class certification, especially if certification will be denied.
13
Rezulin reevaluated the scope of the evidentiary certification hearing in West
Virginia, and gave circuit courts much more guidance than under prior case law.
Prior to Rezulin, the leading case on class certification in West Virginia was
Burks v. Wymer.14 Although Burks states as a general rule that the merits of a
class action may not be considered at the certification stage, it contained some
additional language that could be distorted or manipulated by both plaintiffs and
defendants.
The Burks court began its discussion of whether the merits of a class ac-
tion should be considered at the certification stage by quoting Professor Arthur
Miller, a leading commentator who advocated for the implementation and em-
ployment of discovery and pre-trial hearings in the certification stage.is Profes-
sor Miller first noted how the typical motion for certification is drafted in more
conclusory terms than persuasive, as to whether the requisites for certification
are met, and how little this type of motion aids a judge faced with the decision- 16
of whether a class action is appropriate. Professor Miller concludes his en-
12 See, e.g., CLECKLEY, DAVIS & PALMER, supra note 3, at 458 (citations omitted). Likewise,
commentators agree that dual certification under both 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3) is not proper. See id
This note only discusses dual certification under 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).
13 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) 216-17 (1995).
14 307 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in In re W. Va. Rezulin
Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 64 (W. Va. 2003).
15 Id. at 654.
16 Id.
In all too many instances the papers on the certification motion are extensive in
size but thin in content. The movant typically alleges compliance with each of
the class action prerequisites in highly conclusory terms and devotes most of
his attention to demonstrating that he is a paragon of the bar and a worthy class
20041
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dorsement of the use of discovery methods by stating "[t]he certification issue is
too important to permit the lawyers to furnish boiler plate memoranda laden
with self-serving conclusions."
17
Seemingly, the West Virginia Supreme Court agreed with Professor
Miller's rationale.' 8 Directly following the preceding quote of Professor Miller,
the Court stated "in most cases, an exploration beyond the pleadings is essential
to make an informed judgment on the propriety of a proposed spurious class
action."'19 Briefly, the term "spurious" refers to one of the three types of class
actions that could be brought under the former version of West Virginia Rule
23. 20 A "spurious" class action could be maintained, "where the character of the
right is several and a common question of law or fact is presented and a com-
mon relief is sought."2 1 Although the spurious class action is similar in many
respects to an action under 23(b)(3), courts have realized that the Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 Advisory Committee did not intend for nicknames to be
given to the 1966 revisions, and have therefore refrained from resorting to the
old "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" labels when referring to the current provi-
sions of Rule 23(b).
2 2
The failure of the Burks court to define "an exploration beyond the
pleadings" 23 led to intended confusion. A reasonable interpretation of "an ex-
ploration beyond the pleadings" might permit a circuit court to inquire into basic
factual and legal issues when considering whether certification is appropriate. If
taken in context of Professor Miller's statement, "an exploration beyond the
pleadings" could mean that the circuit court is not strictly limited, and it could
consider materials obtained in discovery, depositions, interrogatories, requests
for admission, as well as testimony received in pre-trial hearings. However, the
Burks court placed a limitation as to what the circuit court could consider at this
representative. In most cases the judge will learn precious little from a docu-
ment like that and probably even less from the defendant's equally conclusory
arguments that the class action prerequisites have not been satisfied.
Id. (quoting ARTHUR MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS, PAST, PRESENT,




20 See MARLYN E. LUGAR & LEE SILVERSTEIN, WEST VIRGINIA RULES 196 (1960). The 1938
version of Rule 23 divided classes into three categories: true, hybrid, and spurious. See id.
21 See Burks, 307 S.E.2d at 649 (citing JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 23.04[l] (2d cd. 1982)); Mitchem v. Melton, 277 S.E.2d 895, 902 n.10 (quoting
LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 196). Cf W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
22 2 ALBA CONTE & HERERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:1 (4th ed. 2002).
23 See Burks, 307 S.E.2d at 654.
[Vol. 107
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stage by using further limiting language. It cautioned that "pre-trial hearings
are to be carefully limited" and quoted from the United States Supreme Court's
decision Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin:25 "Nothing in either the language or
history of Rule 23 ... gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary in-
quiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be main-
tained as a class action."
26
The problem with Burks was not its rationale, but the way the state-
ments were being isolated. An attorney crafting a motion for or against certifi-
cation could quote any of the following statements and cite Burks:
2 7
a. "an exploration beyond the pleadings is essential to make an in-
formed judgment on the propriety of a ... class action."
28
b. "[n]othing in either the language or history of Rule 23 .... gives
a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be main-
tained as a class action. -
29
c. "pre-trial hearings are to be carefully limited."
30
d. "the Supreme Court's ruling in Eisen is not inconsistent with a
full pretrial exploration of the case to ensure that it is an appro-
priate class action."
3 1
These statements were never intended to be isolated. A close reading of
the entire opinion in Burks indicates that the court envisioned the statements to
be read together. The reason Burks cited Eisen was because it had the same fear
as the West Virginia Court had in Rezulin - neither wanted a motion for class
certification to become a mini-trial on the merits.32 However, Burks also real-
ized the importance of actually satisfying the requisites of class certification and
not merely accepting the plaintiffs conclusory allegations as being true, or ac-
cepting the defendant's denials as being true. Burks clearly called for a rigorous
analysis of the requisites for certification. This is reflected in the Court's final
statement in Burks: "Eisen is not inconsistent with a full pretrial exploration of
24 See id.
25 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
26 Burks, 307 S.E.2d at 654 (quoting Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177).
27 For an example, see pages 29-30 of the Petition for Appeal From the Order of the Circuit
Court of Raleigh County filed in the Rezulin case. The Petitioners seem to isolate statements (b)
and (c) in their argument and ignore (d), whereas in pages 20-21 of the Appellees Opposition to
Petition for Appeal the Appellees isolate statement (d) and limit the application of Eisen.
28 Burks, 307 S.E.2d at 654.
29 Id. at 654 (quoting Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 63 (W. Va. 2003).
2004]
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the case to ensure that it is an appropriate class action."33 This statement is es-
sentially a compromise of Professor Miller's viewpoint and the view set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Eisen. This compromise permits a circuit
court to conduct an inquiry into the basic factual and legal issues to ensure certi-
fication was appropriate. This was the framework to be used by circuit courts
when Rezulin was decided the by Circuit Court of Raleigh County in 2001.
The Circuit Court of Raleigh County allowed experts to give testimony
at a two-day certification hearing for a proposed class of Rezulin users and con-
cluded, "the evidence shows that Rezulin was not a defective product for [the
plaintiffs]. " 34 While this finding is clearly on the merits, it is arguably within
the range of factual inquiry permitted by Burks. The supreme court of appeals
took the opportunity in Rezulin to reevaluate the scope of pretrial hearings in
West Virginia.
B. Evidentiary Hearings on the Issue of Certification Revisited in Rezulin
In Rezulin, the supreme court of appeals set forth a clear certification
standard by omitting the language from Burks concerning "pre-trial explora-
tions" and restating Eisen's holding that an inquiry into the merits cannot be
made.35 It emphasized that circuit courts should not ask "whether the... plain-
tiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather
whether that the requirements of Rule 23 are met. ' 36 This is consistent with the
approach taken under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.37 In 1996, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Advisory Committee rejected an amendment
that would require federal courts to make findings related to the probable out-
come on the merits.
38
In Rezulin, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals took the stance
that any doubts as to whether certification is appropriate should be resolved in
favor of the class. 39 The practical effect of Rezulin in a certification proceeding
is that a circuit court is forced to accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as be-
ing true, regardless of the defendant's position on the merits, and it may certify a
class even before liability has been proven. Whether this result is liked or dis-
33 Burks, 307 S.E.2d at 654 (emphasis added). Other courts have interpreted Eisen as only
meaning that "the strength of a plaintiffs claim should not affect the certification decision." Cas-
tano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996). Other Courts have rejected Eisen
altogether. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001).
34 Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 63.
35 Id.
36 Id. (quoting Miller v. Mackey Intern., Inc., 452 F.2d 424,427 (5th Cir. 1971)).
37 Id. at 63 n.7.
38 See Barry F. McNeil, Class Actions: A Time For Change, 23 LITIG. 1, Winter 1997, at 63.
39 Rezuhn, 585 S.E.2d at 65.
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liked, circuit courts finally have a clear ground rule and a standard that cannot
be distorted or manipulated.
As a result of this liberal certification standard, 40 many more classes
may qualify for certification. In fact, it may now be easier to certify drug cases,
prescription or over-the-counter, and possibly a medical malpractice class ac-
tion. A further result of Rezulin may be a decreased number of certification
hearings. Circuit courts may see no need to hear live testimony, thinking it can
decide whether or not to certify a class based on the pleadings. However, courts
should be reluctant to certify any class solely on the pleadings. If a party has
been denied certification, and can prove that their rights have been substantially
impinged upon, failure to hold an evidentiary hearing could result in a subse-
quent reversal. 4 1 As the distinguished authors of The Litigation Handbook on
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure indicate, certification without an
evidentiary hearing should be the exception rather than the rule.
42
III. THE BAD: THE EVER-SHRINKING DISCRETION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
IN THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
In West Virginia, appellate review of a circuit court's order denying cer-
tification takes place through two distinct methods: (1) writ of prohibition and
(2) direct appeal. 44 Prior to Rezulin, a writ of prohibition could be implemented
only where certification was granted. 45 However, in Rezulin, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals allowed this device to be used where certification
was denied. 46 In Rezulin, the class filed a writ of prohibition against the Circuit
40 See In re Baycol Prod. Liab. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 204 (D. Minn. 2003), modified by 219
F.R.D. 468 (D. Minn. 2003), modified by 321 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Minn. 2004) (denying class
certification in prescription drug case and classifying West Virginia as a state with a liberal certi-
fication standard in products liability litigation).
41 See CLECKLEY, DAVIS, & PALMER, supra note 3, at 474-75.
42 Id.
43 Black's Law Dictionary defines a writ of prohibition as "1. A law or order that forbids a
certain action ... 2. An extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court to prevent a lower court
from exceeding its jurisdiction or to prevent a nonjudicial officer or entity from exercising a
power." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1228 (7th ed. 1999).
44 See CLECKLEY, DAVIS, & PALMER, supra note 3, at 449.
45 See id. (citing McFoy v. Amerigas, 295 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1982)).
46 In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003). The Court ex-
plained its analysis for when a writ of prohibition would be entertained:
In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases
not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the
lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five fac-
tors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such
as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be
2004]
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Court of Raleigh County, which refused to return the consolidated cases to the
courts where the actions were individually filed.
47
The Supreme Court of Appeals has long held that the party asserting
class standing may appeal an order denying certification. 4 8 The court recently
reaffirmed this holding in Ways v. Imation Enters. Corp.49 Additionally, in Love
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the court permitted an interlocutory appeal from an
order denying certification based on the class representative's request to conduct
discovery limited to class certification.
51
Allowing an interlocutory appeal in state court is a surprising develop-
ment since Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure does not ex-
pressly permit interlocutory appeals. 2 West Virginia Rule 23 lacks the provi-
sion contained in its federal counterpart which states: "A court of appeals may
in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or
denying class action certification . . . . [a]n appeal does not stay proceedings in
the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders."
53
Nevertheless, allowing an interlocutory appeal from the denial of certification is
consistent with the court's liberal views on appealing certification orders. The
Supreme Court of Appeals has stated "[w]e have in the past taken a rather lib-
eral view of when [a certification] order is appealable."
54
damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether
the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether
the lower tribunal's order is an often repeated error or manifests persistent dis-
regard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribu-
nal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impres-
sion. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point
for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Al-
though all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the
existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.
Id. at 62 (quoting State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 483 S.E.2d 12 (W. Va. 1996).
47 Id. at 76. The cases were consolidated for trial pursuant to West Virginia Trial Court Rule
26.01, which states: "The Mass Litigation Panel shall ... make recommendations to the Chief
Justice on the transfer of actions from one circuit to another in order to facilitate any case man-
agement or trial methodologies developed by the Panel." W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.01.
48 Mitchem v. Melton, 277 S.E.2d 895, 901 (W. Va. 1981).
49 589 S.E.2d 36, 39 n.1 (W. Va. 2003).
50 An interlocutory appeal is "[an appeal that occurs before the trial court's final ruling on the
entire case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (7th ed. 1999). "Some interlocutory appeals involve
legal points necessary to the determination of the case, while others involve collateral orders that
are wholly separate from the merits of the action." Id.
51 590 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2003).
52 See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23.
53 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f).
54 Mitchem v. Melton, 277 S.E.2d 895, 900 (W. Va. 1981) (citing Blackshere v. Blackshere,
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We will now turn from "how" an order for certification is appealed and
examine other aspects of the certification process. The denial or grant of certifi-
cation is the most critical stage in the life of a class action.5 5 If a circuit court
determines that certification is not appropriate, and denies certification, it has
the practical effect of denying relief on the merits to the class. 56 On the other
hand, granting certification may force a defendant into settlement negotiations,
as many defendants are not willing to risk an adverse jury verdict.5 7 Therefore,
the importance of appellate review cannot be overstated; however, the scope of
review exercised by the appellate court must be limited so it does not substitute
its judgment for that of the circuit court. Essentially, the circuit court serves a
gate-keeping function in the certification process. It decides whether the pro-
posed class meets the requisites for certification under Rule 23 and in making
this critical determination it should receive special deference.
58
In the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' recent decision, In re
West Virginia Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison,59 as well as the Court's subsequent
decision in Love,60 the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's
determination as to whether certification was appropriate. 6 1 The reasoning sup-
porting each decision will be examined in turn.
161 S.E. 27 (W. Va. 1931)); see also Parsons v. McCoy, 202 S.E.2d 632 (W. Va. 1973); McDan-
iel v. Romano, 190 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1972) (reviewing orders setting aside default judgments).
55 See Aimee G. Mackay, Comment, Appealability Of Class Certification Orders Under Fed-
eral Rule Of Civil Procedure 2369: Toward A Principled Approach, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 755, 798
(2002) ("The class certification order.., is the most important decision in a class action case: for
the plaintiffs, it means the life or death of their pursuit of their claims; for the defendants, it means
a very close line between almost zero liability and so much liability that settlement is the only
option."); see also Martha Neil, New Route for Class Actions, 89 A.B.A. J. 48 (July, 2003).
56 See Mackay, supra note 55, at 798.
57 See Appellate Practice Group, Recurring Issues In Consumer And Business Class Action
Litigation In Texas, 33 TEX. TECH L. REv. 971, 994 (2002). ("It is conventional wisdom that class
action litigation is often won or lost at the certification stage-certification of a class can lead to a
substantial settlement, while denial of certification greatly reduces a plaintiffs incentive to pursue
the lawsuit."); JV Schwan, Capitol Comment 273 - Class Action Lawsuits: We Are All Victims
Now, Freedom Works, at http://www.cse.org/processor/printer.php?issueid=634 (April 3, 2000)
("certification of frivolous classes often forces the defendant to settle, even though they have done
nothing wrong .... Because of the sheer magnitude of the class, corporations often settle class
actions, rather than risk a verdict that puts them into bankruptcy.").
58 See Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 433 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[the trial
court's] careful analysis of Rule 23's requirements and its detailed factual findings ... reveal no
abuse of discretion .... [W]e cannot say... at this interlocutory stage that the decision to condi-
tionally certify a class action ... constitutes an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of the
special deference due trial courts on this issue") (emphasis added).
59 585 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003).
60 590 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2003).
61 Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 61; Love, 590 S.E.2d at 680.
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A. The Supreme Court of Appeal's Reversal in Rezulin: Abuse of Discre-
tion or Abuse of Power?
Before a class can be certified it must meet all four requirements under
23(a), and at least one of the three requirements under 23(b). If one were to
plot the conclusions of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County and the Supreme
Court of Appeals on a graph, the coordinates would be polar opposites. The
Circuit Court of Raleigh County found that none of the requirements of 23(a) or
23(b) were satisfied. The Supreme Court of Appeals showed absolutely no
deference to these findings. It practically reversed all 125 of the Circuit Court's
conclusions of law, finding that all of the requirements of 23(a) were met, as
well as the requirements of both 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). 64
In reaching this conclusion, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals employed a two-tiered analysis.65 First, the Court set forth an abuse of
discretion standard66 to review the circuit court's order denying class certifica-
tion.67 Next, it applied a de novo standard of review to the Circuit Court's in-
terpretation of Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
68
Based upon the above test articulated by the supreme court of appeals, it
may appear that the circuit court received substantial deference. However, a
closer look will show that this is not necessarily true. The circuit court's "inter-
pretation of Rule 23" and its "determination of whether the requisites for a class
action are met" are part of a similar inquiry. The requisites for a class action are
found within the text of Rule 23.6 9 This two-tiered approach implemented by
the Supreme Court of Appeals is so flexible it can review virtually any class
certification decision de novo.
62 See W. VA. R. CIv. P. 23.
63 See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 2001 WL 1818442, **14-25 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13,
2001) (unpublished decision), rev 'd sub noma. In re West Virginia Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchinson,
585 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003).
64 Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 76.
65 ld. at61.
66 An abuse of discretion standard of review for class certification is appropriate according to
most courts and leading commentators. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. 151 F.3d 402,
407 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying abuse of discretion standard to determine whether certification
under 23(b)(2) was appropriate); see also 4 CoNT & NEWBERG, supra note 22, at § 13:62. Ac-
cording to West Virginia case law, an abuse of discretion standard is defined as "when a material
factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all
proper and no improper factors are assessed but the circuit court makes a serious mistake in
weighing them." State ex rel. Leung v. Sanders, 584 S.E.2d 203, 209 (W. Va. 2003).
67 Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 61; see also Love v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 590 S.E.2d 677, 680 (W.
Va. 2003); Ways v. Imation Enters. Corp., 589 S.E.2d 36, 41 (W. Va. 2003).
68 Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 61.
69 See supra note 2 for the relevant text of W. VA. R. CIv. P. 23.
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After reading the following sections it should be clear to the reader that
if the supreme court of appeals reviewed the decision of the Circuit Court of
Raleigh County with any deference the Circuit Court's order denying certifica-
tion would have been upheld.
1. Comparing and Contrasting the Supreme Court of Appeal's
Opinion in Rezulin with the Findings of the Circuit Court of Ra-
leigh County
Before examining the Rezulin decision, it is important to understand the
choices the Circuit Court of Raleigh County was forced to make in determining
whether certifying a class of Rezulin users was appropriate. The supreme court
of appeals had not interpreted Rule 23 since its amendment in 1998. 70 The cir-
70 While many states readily adopted the 1966 version of the federal Rule 23, the West Vir-
ginia Court did not feel compelled to change its archaic ways. Indeed, by 1998, the only states
still using a variation of the 1938 version of Rule 23 were Georgia, Missouri, North Carolina and
West Virginia. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 22, at § 13:3.
The former version of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 23 read as follows:
a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as
will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue
or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against
the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a pri-
mary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby
becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23 (1997) (repealed 1998).
Notice that the 1938 version of Rule 23 is divided into three categories: true, hybrid, and spurious.
"[Tihose falling under the first subparagraph [are] 'true class suits', that is, ones wherein, but for
the class action device, the joinder of all interested persons would be essential." LUGAR &
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 196. In other words, suits brought under (a)(1) sought to enforce
shared rights among class members, an example of which would be an action by a group of tax-
payers against a municipality. See generally Callen v. Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. 212, 215 (Common
Pleas Mercer Co. Pa. 1952) (citing Gericke v. Philadelphia, 44 A.2d 233 (Pa. 1945)). The second
type, the hybrid class suit, involves a suit where "the rights of the members of the class are sev-
eral, but the joint or common interests are replaced by the property affected by the rights involved
in the litigation." LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 196. The hybrid suit under former
23(a)(2) could be considered a predecessor of the modem "limited fund" class action under the
current version of 23(b)(1)(B). 1 CoNTE & NEWBERG, supra note 22, at § 1.09. Classic limited
fund class actions include claimants to trust assets, a bank account, insurance proceeds, company
assets in a liquidation sale, proceeds of a ship sale in a maritime accident suit, and others. See
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834-35 (1999). Examples of what would be considered a
hybrid class action include claims against specific property, such as trust funds, realty and assets
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cuit court was faced with several decisions of first impression for a West Vir-
ginia court. It applied existing West Virginia precedent, and, when necessary,
chose from a wide-ranging body of applicable law, both state and federal. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court of Appeals, the Circuit Court of Raleigh County
made all of the wrong choices.71 The supreme court of appeals found error even
though the circuit court's findings were substantially similar to those of the Cali-
fornia Superior Court72 and the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of an insolvent. See Echols v. Star Loan Co. 274 So.2d 51, 57 (Ala. 1973) (interpreting ALA.
EQUITY R. 31 (a)(2), which is identical to the former W. VA. R. Civ. P 23(a)(2)).
Lastly, the spurious class action could be maintained "where the character of the right is several
and a common question of law or fact is presented and a common relief is sought." Burks v. Wy-
mer, 307 S.E.2d 647, 649 (W. Va. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at
64; see also Mitchem, 277 S.E.2d at 902 n. 10 (quoting LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra note 20, at
196). A common example of this type of suit would be where several purchasers of stock sued to
recover money where they had been induced to buy stock by a common fraudulent representation.
See Callen, 83 Pa. D. & C. at 215 (citing Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51 (3d
Cir. 1939)); ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION IN A
NUTSHELL 9 (1999).
Needless to say, these three categories proved to be difficult to apply with any type of consistency.
See ROBERT KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY
LITIGATION 32-39 (2d. 2000). The three categories often overlapped, making it difficult to deter-
mine who was bound by a judgment. See id. The judgments in true and hybrid extended to the
class, but the judgment in a spurious action extended only to the parties, and only these parties
would be bound by the judgment. See LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 196.
Presumably, the use of subclasses are permitted in West Virginia after Rezulin. See Rezulin, 585
S.E.2d at 73. Subclasses were not permitted under former Rule 23. See Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ. v. Jefferson County Educ. Ass'n, 393 S.E.2d 653, 660 (W. Va. 1990) (quoting Mitchem, 277
S.E.2d at 896) ("There is no requirement ... in our Rule 23 as there is in Rule 23(c)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the use of subclasses."). In Rezulin, the West Virginia Court
seemingly approves the use of subclasses as a management tool. 585 S.E.2d at 73.
71 In Part III, Sections C and D of the Rezulin opinion, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed
every finding of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County regarding the interpretation of West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b) with one exception discussed later in this note. Rezulin,
585 S.E.2d at 64-76.
72 See Delaney v. Warner-Lambert Co., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2883 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 26, 2003) (unpublished decision). In January 2002, a California trial court denied certifica-
tion of a class of Rezulin users under California's Consumer's Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and
its Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Id. at *2. Although California has not adopted Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for all purposes, "the California Supreme Court has adopted
Federal Rule 23, both by reliance upon the Rule and upon federal decisions interpreting it, and by
reference to the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act ... which incorporates most of Rule
23's actual language." Elizabeth J. Cabraser et. al., California Class Action Practice and Proce-
dure, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SURVEY OF STATE CLASS ACTION LAW- 2002 57 (2002).
The Superior Court of Los Angeles found that common questions of fact or law did not
predominate over individual issues since the CLRA claim "would involve individualized inquiry
as to whether each class member sustained any damage as a result of the allegedly false advertis-
ing." Delaney, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2883, at **29-30. Similarly, under the UCL claim,
the inquiry would be whether Rezulin was effective to each member. Id. The other reasons this
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of New York73 -- similar cases faced with certifying a class of Rezulin users. It is
likely that the decision by the California Superior Court and the Multi District
Litigation ("MDL") in New York followed the rationale of the Circuit Court of
Raleigh County since the Circuit Court of Raleigh County was the first to deny
certification in a Rezulin class action and was the first to have its findings pub-
lished in an online legal database. 74 In fact, the MDL Court referenced the deci-
sion of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, stating "It therefore is not surpris-
ing that all relevant ... court decisions have rejected class certification in prod-
ucts liability cases., 75 "Nor ... is it surprising that ... California and West Vir-
ginia [state courts have] declined to certify classes in other Rezulin cases."
'76
Court denied class certification centered on the selection of class representatives. Id. It found the
claims of the class representatives were not typical of those of the other class members since the
representatives were not misled in the same manner as the class and because the representatives
did not see the same advertisements that allegedly misled the class. Id. Additionally, the repre-
sentatives were not asserting all of the same claims that were being raised by the class, such as
false advertising. Id. at *50. For these reasons the Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the
decision of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Id. at *56. The three-judge panel found
that "[tihere can be no class certification unless it is determined by the trial court that similarly
situated persons have sustained damage." Id. at *46.
73 Similarly, in September 2002, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied certification under federal rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). See In re Rezulin Prods.
Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In this action, hundreds of individual product
liability actions were consolidated for trial and transferred to this forum. Id. at 62. Judge Lewis
A. Kaplan denied certification of a class consisting of "all persons who ingested Rezulin and their
spouses, and a subclass of asymptomatic Rezulin users who have not yet manifested physical
injury." Id. The class sought certification under 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) and the subclass sought relief
in the form of medical monitoring under (b)(2). Id. Judge Kaplan denied certification under
(b)(3) because he found that the factors listed within (b)(3) weigh heavily against certification. Id.
at 66. The Court noted that some of the plaintiffs alleged physical injury while others alleged
enhanced risk of injury. Id. Each plaintiff who alleged physical injury would have to prove cau-
sation on his or her injury since the circumstances surrounding each plaintiff were unique. Id.
Also, the Court found that the alleged deceptive practices implemented by the defendant would
require a similar inquiry into individual issues. Id. at 68. Therefore, the Court found that the New
Jersey Consumer Protection Act was not applicable to the class. Id. The Court also denied medi-
cal monitoring relief for the subclass under (b)(2). Id. at 74. However, the Court stated that even
if the subclass qualified for treatment under 23(b)(2), the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the require-
ments of (b)(2) since the class was not cohesive. Id. at 75.
74 The opinion of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County can be viewed in its entirety at In re W.
Va. Rezulin Litig., 2001 WL 1818442 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2001) (unpublished decision),
rev'd sub nom. W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchinson, 585 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003).
75 In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. at 65-66.
76 Id. at 66.
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a. Conflicting Interpretations of West Virginia Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a)
In its order denying certification, the circuit court found that none of the
requisites of 23(a) were met.77 Perhaps the findings of the Circuit Court of Ra-
leigh County would have received more deference by the Supreme Court of
Appeals had it adopted the approach taken by the Federal MDL Court of assum-
ing without deciding 23(a) was satisfied and instead focused on why certifica-
tion under 23(b) was not appropriate. 78 The circuit court's denial "across the
board" seemed to weaken its overall argument against certification. Moreover,
the circuit court's strict interpretation of 23(a)'s requirements might have been
thought to frustrate the goals of the class action device. 79 In this Note, it is only
contended that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying certifica-
tion under 23(a)(1), the numerosity requirement. Accordingly, 23(a)(1) will be
the only factor under 23(a) that will be discussed.
Rule 23(a)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure states: (a)
"One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. "8
In Rezulin, the Circuit Court of Raleigh County interpreted 23(a)(l)'s
requirement of "impracticability of joining all members" as not requiring impos-. . .... 81
sibility, only difficulty or inconvenience. The circuit court utilized a rather
mechanical test to see whether the requirement of numerosity was satisfied. 82 It
evaluated the following factors:
a. Size (no minimum number, must be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis);
b. Geographic dispersion of the class;
c. Facts of a specific case;
77 See In re W Va. RezulinLitig.,2001 WL 1818442, at**14-25.
78 See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. at 66 ("In this case, the Court assumes
without deciding that the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied.").
79 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORT, MARCH 31, 1987: PRELIMINARY STUDY OF
COMPLEX LITIGATION 34-48 (giving a strict interpretation to the requisites for certification frus-
trates the use of class actions as vehicles to deter corporate wrongdoing).
80 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
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d. Several members of the putative class reside outside the
court's jurisdiction;
e. Where members are poor, uneducated, or otherwise not in-
clined or able to bring individual actions.
83
In applying these factors to the proposed class, the circuit court con-
cluded that the classes consisting of between 2,000 and 5,000 plaintiffs did not
show that the proposed class was "so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable."84 On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did
not rely on the factors listed above.8 5 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals refused to adopt a "magic minimum number" that would qualify a class• • 86
for certification under 23(a)(1). But, the court indicated it would certify a very
small number under the right circumstances, citing with approval actions where
as few as seventeen members made up the class.
8 7
In reversing the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, the Supreme Court of
Appeals made clear that the identity or even an approximate number of other
class members are not needed for the determination of numerosity. 88 This inter-
pretation of 23(a)(1) creates a very liberal standard for determining the nu-
merosity requirement. Newberg states, "[c]ourts have denied class motions for
lack of numerosity when the plaintiff has failed to provide facts or demonstrate
circumstances that would provide support for a reasonable estimate of class
size."
89
Whether the plaintiffs in Rezulin presented a reasonable estimate of
class size is debatable. The Supreme Court of Appeals appears to camouflage
83 Id. Although the circuit court does not cite the source of these factors, they are similar to
those listed in Newberg:
Apart from class size, factors relevant to the joinder impracticability issue in-
clude judicial economy arising from avoidance of a multiplicity of actions,
geographic dispersement of class members, size of individual claims, financial
resources of class members, the ability of claimants to institute individual suits,
and requests for prospective injunctive relief which would involve future class
members.
1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 22, at § 3:6.
84 See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 2001 WL 1818442, at *16.
85 See W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 65-67 (W. Va. 2003).
86 Id. at 65.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 66.
89 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 22, at § 3:6; see also Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., Getting it
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this in its opinion. The court states that the estimated class size is 5,000 and that
2,000 are represented by counsel, but it indicates in a footnote, "[iut is unclear
whether lawsuits have been filed on behalf of these individuals, or whether the
plaintiffs attorneys actually represent these individuals or simply know that
these individuals wish to assert claims against the defendants." 9° Based upon
this footnote, it is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court of Appeals
merely took the plaintiff's word at face value regarding the approximate number
of class members and did not require counsel to demonstrate facts or circum-
stances to provide a reasonable estimate.
It was not unreasonable, and certainly not an abuse of discretion for the
Circuit Court of Raleigh County to require a reasonable estimate of the proposed
class because other courts have held when class size is unclear it is not an abuse
of discretion to deny certification. 91 It seems in prior cases the Supreme Court
of Appeals gave more deference to the circuit court in determining whether the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23 was satisfied. For example, in 1964, the
court decided Robertson v. Hatcher,92 in which it announced the same abuse of
discretion standard of review as it did in Rezulin: "whether the persons constitut-
ing a class are 'so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court' depends upon the circumstances in each case, and whether to 9 ermit a
class action on this basis rests in the sound discretion of the trial court."
In Robertson, taxpayers, certain officials, and others filed an action
against the Circuit Clerks of Kanawha County, Wirt County, and Doddridge
County, seeking to determine the constitutionality of 1963 W. Va. Acts 158.
4
This Act purported to "divide the state into senatorial districts and to apportion
membership of the house of delegates and congressional districts." 95 The circuit
court determined that the class failed to meet the numerosity requirement and
required the plaintiffs to amend the complaint to include all thirteen circuit
clerks that were affected by the Act.96 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals upheld this determination, finding that the circuit court acted within its
discretion in determining that the members of the class were not so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them before the court.
9 7
90 Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 66 n.10.
91 See, e.g., Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir. 1981) (sug-
gesting when the size of a class is unclear, a court has not abused its discretion in holding the class
failed to establish numerosity).
92 135 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1964).
93 Id. at 679 (quoting LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 194).
94 Id. at 677-80.
95 Id.
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While the Rezulin court's lenient interpretation of the numerosity re-
quirement may allow many actions to be certified that would have otherwise
failed, it seems that the supreme court of appeals has merely substituted its judg-
ment for that of the circuit court.
It is maintained in this Note that the supreme court of appeals has ar-
ticulated a standard of review that is too flexible. When reviewing whether cer-
tification in a particular case is appropriate, the supreme court of appeals can
exercise a de novo standard of review virtually whenever it desires. In Rezulin,
the supreme court of appeals set forth an abuse of discretion standard but noted
that the circuit court's discretion "must be exercised in the context of the appro-
priate rules of procedure." 98 In the Rezulin opinion, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals indicates that it is not overturning the Circuit Court of Raleigh County by
stating, "the circuit court was called upon to apply and interpret Rule 23 of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure."99 "As we stated in . . . Keesecker v.
Bird, "An interpretation of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure presents a
question of law subject to a de novo review.
' 10
Therefore, as long as the Supreme Court of Appeals exercises a de novo
review in determining whether the requisites of Rule 23 are satisfied, circuit
court orders granting or denying certification will really not be receiving much
deference on appellate review and certainly not a review employing a "true"
abuse of discretion approach.
There is one final thought on the West Virginia Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of numerosity in Rezulin. Since the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals adopted such a liberal interpretation of the numerosity requirement, it
seems if enough putative members either decide not to join a certified class or
exercise the right to opt out of a (b)(3) class, the circuit court could at a later
time decertify the class. Nowhere in its opinion in Rezulin did the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court suggest that once the numerosity requirement was deemed
satisfied it would continue to be satisfied for the duration of the action.
As stated previously, all four requirements of 23(a) must be satisfied
and at least one of the requirements of 23(b).10 1 By denying relief under all four
elements of 23(a) and all three elements of 23(b), it appears that the circuit court
abused its discretion in the Rezulin litigation. But, even assuming that the cir-
cuit court abused its discretion in denying relief under all four factors of 23(a),
if the class does not satisfy any one of the three subsections of 23(b), the class
must not be certified. 102 We shall now examine the analysis of the Circuit Court
of Raleigh County and the Supreme Court of Appeals under 23(b).
98 In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchinson, 585 S.E.2d 52, 61 (W. Va. 2003).
99 Id.
100 Id. (citations omitted).
101 See id. at 64.
102 See W. VA. R. Crv. P. 23.
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b. Conflicting Interpretations of West Virginia Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)
The Rezulin class sought certification under (b)(3) for personal injury
claims, under (b)(1) and (b)(3) for punitive damages, and (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)
for injunctive relief in the form of a medical monitoring program. Unques-
tionably, in an equitable action under (b)(2), monetary relief cannot predominate
over injunctive relief.104 The Advisory Committee notes for Federal Rule
23(b)(2) state that, "[t]he subdivision does not extend to cases in which the ap-
propriate final relief relates exclusively or predominately to money dam-
ages."' 0 5 Since punitive damages were sought under (b)(1) and (b)(3), non-
monetary relief could not possibly predominate over monetary relief. Therefore,
the circuit court concluded that by the express language of the Advisory Com-
mittee, the action for damages could not proceed under (b)(2).
106
Additionally, the circuit court found that the class lacked the requisite
cohesiveness to qualify for class treatment under (b)(2). 107 Since the question of
cohesiveness was a question of first impression for a West Virginia court, the
Circuit Court of Raleigh County was forced to choose between two different
approaches, the approach taken by the Third Circuit in Barnes v. American To-
bacco Co.,108 or the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Walters v. 
Reno.10 9
The circuit court chose the Barnes approach, which requires cohesiveness in
(b)(2) classes.110 But, whether the West Virginia Rule 23(b)(2) requires cohe-
siveness, as well as whether the West Virginia Consumer Protection Act is a
suitable vehicle for class treatment, are questions of law appropriate for a de
novo review by the Supreme Court of Appeals.II But, in this case, the Supreme
Court of Appeals should not have reached the issue of cohesiveness because at
103 See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 2001 WL 1818442, *14 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2001)
(unpublished opinion), rev'd sub nom. Rezulin, 585 S.E. 2d at 52.
104 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes; see also 7A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1775 (2d ed. 1986).
105 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes.
106 See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 2001 WL 1818442, at *19.
107 See id.
108 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d. Cir. 1998) (holding that class claims must be cohesive); see also
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 249 (3d. Cir. 1975) (invoking a cohesiveness
requirement for (b)(2) claims).
109 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that complaints of a pattern or practice appli-
cable to the class as a whole is sufficient for satisfying the requirements of (b)(2)).
11o In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 2001 WL 1818442, at *19.
III See Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[t]he district court
has determined that the FDCPA [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act] bars serial class action suits.
This determination is purely legal, and we review de novo.").
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the time the Circuit Court of Raleigh County considered certification the action
was predominated by monetary relief sought under (b)(1) and (b)(3); therefore,
treatment under (b)(2) was not appropriate.
Notice that on appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
the plaintiffs did not challenge the circuit court's denial of the (b)(1) claim.
112
This omission of the (b)(1) claim was a very clever procedural maneuver. In
fact, it may have given the class a "second bite at the apple." By discarding the
(b)(1) claim requesting punitive damages, the (b)(2) requirement discussed
above, that "monetary relief cannot predominate over injunctive relief," became
easier to satisfy. If the (b)(1) claim had not been omitted on appeal it is likely
that the Supreme Court of Appeals would have been forced to deny relief under
(b)(2), which would prohibit the use of a medical monitoring class.
The Circuit Court of Raleigh County's denial of the (b)(1) claim seems
to be the only finding that was not overturned on appeal. 113 Presumably, the
circuit court's interpretation of 23(b)(1) is an accurate interpretation because the
Supreme Court of Appeals did not feel compelled to discuss it, 114 and its inter-
pretation is in accord with other jurisdictions. 15
This brings the discussion to the (b)(3) claim. The circuit court found
that individual issues prevented the application of (b)(3) just as the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York and the California Superior
Court found when faced with certifying a class of Rezulin users.1 16 If the circuit
court had granted certification under (b)(3), it would have been an abuse of its
discretion. The granting of certification under (b)(3) would have been a drastic
extension of medical monitoring relief under existing West Virginia case law.
The leading case on medical monitoring relief in West Virginia is Bower v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 117 Bower contains a six-part test that must be met
before a plaintiff can obtain medical monitoring relief.118 But, extending Bower
112 In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 2001 WL 1818442, at *19. The circuit court found that relief
could not be granted under (b)(1)(A) in an action for damages because it applies only to actions
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief Id.
"13 See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 70 (W. Va. 2003). "The plain-
tiffs do not assert a position as to whether they meet the qualifications of Rule 23(b)(1), and we
therefore do not discuss this part of the rule." Id.
114 See id.
115 See, e.g., Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1976).
116 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
117 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999). For a complete discussion of Bower see Shannon L. Smith
Wolfe, Student Work, The Recovery Of Medical Monitoring Costs: An Argument For The Fund
Mechanism In The Wake Of Bower V. Westinghouse, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 103 (2000).
118 Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 426. In order to sustain a claim for medical monitoring expenses
under West Virginia law, the plaintiff must prove that
(1) he or she has, relative to the general population, been significantly exposed;
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to the facts presented before the Court in Rezulin was a bit radical. Bower was a
case dealing with the accidental exposure of six persons to toxic chemicals con-
tained in a two-acre, 42 feet deep, cullet pile containing debris from the manu-
facture of light bulbs, 119 it was not a prescription drug class action involving
thousands of potential litigants. The Circuit Court of Raleigh County recog-
nized this distinction, stating in its findings:
Allowing a medical monitoring remedy in a case involving a
prescription drug has enormous implications, and class certifi-
cation of such a claim has even greater implications .... If any
court should authorize such an extension of the law, it should be
a policy-making appellate court rather than a trial court.
12 0
As the circuit court indicates, the extension of Bower was better suited
for the Supreme Court of Appeals than the circuit court. In Rezulin, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals took the opportunity to extend Bower to the realm of
class action litigation.'21
The Supreme Court of Appeals found that the first two elements of
Bower, (1) significant exposure in comparison with the general population, and
(2) to a proven hazardous substance, common among the entire class. 122 It also
observed that the class would probably succeed in demonstrating that the defen-
dant's tortious conduct was directed toward the public as a whole, thereby satis-
fying the third factor of Bower.123 However, it conceded that whether the final
three elements of Bower are met is less clear and stated only that the evidence
indicates that the class will "have an increased risk of contracting a serious dis-
ease, and that the increased risk makes it reasonably necessary for the plaintiffs
(2) to a proven hazardous substance;
(3) through the tortious conduct of the defendant;
(4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has suffered an increased risk of contract-
ing a serious latent disease;
(5) the increased risk of disease makes it reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to undergo
periodic diagnostic medical examinations different from what would be prescribed in the
absence of the exposure; and
(6) monitoring procedures exist that make the early detection of a disease possible.
Id.
119 Id. at 426-27.
120 See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 2001 WL 1818442, at *21 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2001)
(unpublished opinion), rev'd sub nom. Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 52.
121 See Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 72-73.
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to undergo periodic medical examinations using existing monitoring procedures,
different from what would have been required of the plaintiffs in the absence of
their use of Rezulin."'
124
Interestingly, the supreme court of appeals did not refer to the sixth
element of Bower, which is that "monitoring procedures exist that make detec-
tion of a disease possible." 125 The supreme court of appeals concluded its ap-
plication of Bower by extending it to the Rezulin class action, stating, "because
all plaintiffs in the proposed class took Rezulin, the plaintiffs assert that all
members of the class are at risk for an idiosyncratic reaction and injury."
126
This is a much lower threshold than set forth in Bower. Under the Rezulin
court's analysis, a class member is not required to demonstrate that the medica-
tion or drug was the proximate cause of his or her injury. All that must be shown
at the certification stage is an increased risk of future harm to trigger medical
monitoring relief.
After examining the Circuit Court of Raleigh County's conclusions of
law and the opinion by the Supreme Court of Appeals, several things are appar-
ent. Perhaps the most striking is the contrast in the tenor of the two opinions.
The anti-certification stance taken by the circuit court and the pro-certification
position taken by the Supreme Court of Appeals. It seems odd that two separate
courts can reach such drastically different results.
2. Result-Oriented Decision Making or Sound Judicial Reasoning?
In reversing the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, the Supreme Court of
Appeals states that "[t]he circuit court, in its order denying class certification,
appears to have relied almost exclusively on federal cases interpreting Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - and denying class certification - in
drug or medical device actions."'12 7 However, in a recent dissenting opinion,
Justice Davis observed that,
Due to the similarities between our Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules, we often look to decisions of the Federal
Courts interpreting their rules as persuasive authority on how to
apply our own rules .... [W]e follow our usual practice of giv-
ing substantial weight to federal cases in determining the mean-
ing and scope of our rules of civil procedure.
2 8
124 Id.
125 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
126 Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 73.
127 Id. at 61.
128 Love v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 590 S.E.2d 677, 681 n.2 (W. Va. 2003) (Davis, J.,
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It is difficult to reconcile this quote with the Court's opinion in Rezulin.
A possible explanation of the Supreme Court of Appeals' aversion to federal
cases interpreting Rule 23 is that the Rezulin decision was result-oriented.
There is no denying class action litigation is a very political topic. The Republi-
can party is constantly supporting legislation aimed at tort reform. 129 We live in
an era where the class action system is under constant attack by conserva-
tives,130 President Bush, 131 and even a few Democrats. 132 It is ironic that during
this time period the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals proclaims the
strengths of the class action device. However, there are many factors suggesting
that Rezulin was not the product of partisan politics, but an example of a court
using the class action device to its full potential, as a "vehicle for correcting
wrongs committed by large-scale enterprise upon individual consumers."
133
dissenting) (quoting State ex. rel. Ball v. Cummings, 540 S.E.2d 917, 923 (W. Va. 1999) (quoting
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 464 S.E.2d 181, 187 (W. Va. 1995))).
129 See e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2002), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju77557.000/hju77557_0f.htm.
The introduction to this Bill speaks volumes as to its desired result:
Class action lawsuits in America have raised a number of grave concerns. Cur-
rently, our rules foster a game where attorneys lump thousands and sometimes
millions of speculative claims in one class action and race to any available State
courthouse in hopes of a rubber-stamped settlement. It is a part of our civil jus-
tice system that has gone wild. Over the past 10 years State court class action
filings have increased 1,000 percent. This creates an enormous economic drain
on small businesses, big industries and insurers, and provides windfall attorney
fees while individual class members usually receive a small fraction of any set-
tlement award.
Id.
130 In October 2003, the GOP and its Democratic supporters failed in its attempt to pass the
Class Action Reform Act, a bill with the primary goal of pushing class-action lawsuits into the
federal court system and away from state courts, which are typically more generous to plaintiffs.
Charles Hurt, Democrats Kill Bill On Class-Action Reform, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, October 22,
2003, at Al, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20031022-115704-
7759r.htm.
131 See Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2004,
at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, N.Y. Times File (discussing how "[the] Bush admini-
stration has been going to court to block lawsuits by consumers who say they have been injured by
prescription drugs and medical devices"); see also Robert Dreyfuss, George W. 's Compassion, 10
AMERICAN PROSPECT 46 (September 1, 1999), at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww? sec-
tion--root&name=ViewPrint&articleld=4507 (discussing political contributions from big tobacco
and how "no one has more at stake in tort reform than the tobacco industry").
132 Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn, was successful in getting support from Democ-
rats such as Sen. Tom Carper, D-Del. See Senate Democrats Kill Lawsuit Reform, NEwSMAX.cOM
(October 23, 2003), at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/10/22/170257.shtml.
133 In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 62 (W. Va. 2003) (quoting McFoy
v. Amerigas, Inc., 295 S.E.2d 16, 24 (W. Va. 1982)).
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It seems that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is interested
in making companies change the way they do business and in deterring future
wrongdoing. The West Virginia Court stood united in Rezulin, with no concur-
ring or dissenting opinions. This unusual unity, especially for the West Virginia
Court, signals that it is firmly convinced that the Rezulin case is the ideal medi-
cal monitoring, products liability action, and it is worthy of class action treat-
ment. 134 It remains to be seen what effect, if any, the Rezulin decision will have
on small businesses, big industries and insurers in West Virginia.
Although Rezulin was a huge step forward for consumers in West Vir-
ginia, it came at a diminishment of the discretion of the Circuit Court, and un-
fortunately, it was not the last diminishment.
B. The Bad Aspects of Love v. Georgia-Pacific
The Supreme Court of Appeal's decision in Love is "bad" in
two respects. First, the Supreme Court of Appeals did not give the Circuit Court
of Fayette County the deference that it should have. Second, the Supreme Court
of Appeals did not define what is "reasonable" regarding discovery related to
the issue of class certification. Each will be discussed in turn.
In Love v. Georgia-Pacific,135 a class action commenced under the
Wage Payment and Collection Act,136 the class representative sought discovery
limited to class certification issues and the Circuit Court of Fayette County de-
nied this request. 13 7 After sitting forth an abuse of discretion standard of re-
view, the Supreme Court of Appeals in a per curiam138 opinion, proceeded to
reverse the circuit court's denial of certification. 139 It held that "where issues
related to class certification are present, reasonable discovery related to class
certification issues is appropriate, particularly where the pleadings and record do
134 In contrast, the Circuit Court of Raleigh County stated "While there may be an appropriate
drug 'exposure' case that meets the interests stated in Bower, Rezulin is not the one." In re W.
Va. Rezulin Litig., 2001 WL 1818442, at *21 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2001) (unpublished deci-
sion), rev'd sub nom. Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d 52.
135 590 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2003).
t36 W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-1 to -18 (2003).
137 Love, 590 S.E.2d at 679.
138 "[A]ny per curiam decision, because it represents the decision of a majority of the court, is
'as much a part of the common law of this jurisdiction as any other opinion rendered by this
Court."' Walker v. Doe, 558 S.E.2d 290, 295-96 (W. Va. 2001) (quoting Harmon v. Fayette
County Bd. of Educ., 516 S.E.2d 748, 761 n.1 (W. Va. 1999) (McGraw, J., dissenting)). The
Court in Doe further stated "per curiam opinions are generally entitled to the same weight as the
syllabus of a decision in stating the law." Id.
139 Love, 590 S.E.2d at 681.
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not sufficiently indicate the presence or absence of the requisite facts to warrant
an initial determination of class action status."
' 140
In support of this statement the court resorted to its 1982 decision in
Burks v. Wymer. 14 1 Burks was decided under the former version of Rule 23 of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 42 Love revived the Burks state-
ment that "an exploration beyond the pleadings is essential to make an informed
judgment on the propriety of a proposed spurious class action." 14 3 Applying
this framework to the facts presented in the case, the Love court found that the
class representative would be "severely hampered in her ability to address and to
meet her burden for class certification under Rule 23" if not allowed to conduct
discovery on the issue of certification. 144 It remanded the action back to the
Circuit Court of Fayette County and mandated that the circuit court permit dis-
covery on class certification issues.
145
In her dissent, Justice Davis, who had recused herself from the Rezulind.• 146
decision, explained how the Circuit Court of Fayette County did not abuse its
discretion in denying the plaintiffs an opportunity to conduct discovery. 47 She
noted that the class representative failed to "adequately protect the interests of
the class as required by 23(a)(4)" by not advancing the litigation in a four and
one-half year period.14 Justice Davis explained that this circumstance alone
was sufficient grounds to deny class certification.
149
The standard of review in determining viability of class actions claims
has been a part of West Virginia's jurisprudence for halfa century. 150 The stan-
dard is best summarized in the 1981 case of Mitchem v. Melton as follows:
"Whether the requisites for a class action exist rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court.'' 15 1 After announcing it in both Love and Rezulin, 52 the Court
140 Id. (emphasis added).
141 307 S.E.2d 647, 654 (W. Va. 1982).
142 See supra note 70 for a summary of the prior version of Rule 23.
143 Love, 590 S.E.2d at 681(quoting Burks, 307 S.E.2d at 654).
44 Id.
145 Id.
146 In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003). Apparently this
recusal was because her spouse, Scott Segal, was one of class counsel. For further details see
Supreme Court Gives Drug Case Class Action Status, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 4, 2003, at
6A, available on LEXIS, News Library, The Charleston Gazette File.
147 Love, 590 S.E.2d at 681-82 (Davis, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 682 (Davis, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Davis, J., dissenting).
150 See Robertson v. Hatcher, 135 S.E.2d 675, 679 (W. Va. 1964).
151 277 S.E.2d 895, 896 (W. Va. 1981).
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failed in both cases to adhere to the standard of review. Therefore, as Justice
Davis points out, the circuit court did not act impro erly in denying class certifi-
cation under the circumstances presented in Love.
Additionally, the court in Love failed to set clear boundaries for discov-
ery on the issue of certification. To clarify, in class actions there are two types
of discovery: (1) discovery on the merits, and (2) discovery on information rele-
vant to certification issues. 154 Part II of this Note considered Rezulin's impact
on discovery relating to the merits of a class action. 155 This portion addresses
discovery related to certification issues.
The dissent in Love noted several important issues that the majority
failed to address. 56 In her dissent, Justice Davis pointed out that discovery on
the issue of certification is not automatic, and that the decision of whether or not
to allow class certification discovery lies "within the sound discretion of the
circuit court." 157 Generally, discovery on certification issues is not permitted of
putative class members. 158 Instead, discovery on information relevant to certifi-
cation issues is directed at the class representatives or named parties. 59 Fur-
thermore, this type of discovery is normally limited to specific areas of inquiry
by the court, such as the adequacy of a proposed class representative, numeros-
ity, etc.'
60
In the event that a circuit court concludes that discovery on the issue of
certification is desirable, it should follow the guidelines recommended in the
Manual for Complex Litigation, Third, which encourages courts to aid in devis-
ing a specific discovery plan, cautioning that "[d]iscovery relat[ed] to class [cer-
tification] issues may overlap substantially with merits discovery."'
161
However, drawing a line between "class" and "merits" issues is often.... 162
difficult, if not impossible. The concern with this overlap is that it may allow
a "peak at the other player's cards," resulting in an early settlement of a claim or
152 See Love, 590 S.E.2d at 680; In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 62 (W. Va. 2003).
153 Love, 590 S.E.2d at 681-82 (Davis, J., dissenting).
154 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 13, at 215.
155 See supra Part II.
156 Love, 590 S.E.2d at 681-82 (Davis, J. dissenting).
157 Id. at 682 (Davis, J., dissenting).




162 See generally KLONOFF & BILICH, supra note 70, at 316-22.
20041
27
Dorsey: The Good, the Bad, and the Ambiguous: Recent Developments in West
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
even a dismissal. 63 Defendants will normally be the ones opposing discovery
on class certification because potentially damaging documents dealing with the
merits of the plaintiffs' claims may be obtained.164 This is likely to occur in
West Virginia since the Court of Appeals did not state what is "reasonable" with
discovery related to certification. Circuit courts may allow plaintiffs to get a
look into the merits prior to certification by giving the term "reasonable" a
broad definition. But, it should be remembered that discovery on the issue of
certification can benefit the defense as much as, or more than, the plaintiff be-
cause the defense may uncover facts that completely destroy the plaintiff's case.
Nevertheless, it should also be remembered that if discovery on the is-
sue of certification is permitted, it should be a two-way street. 165 "[B]oth sides
should be permitted to support their position for or against certification by en-
gaging in discovery." 166 As Part II of this Note suggests, the Supreme Court of
Appeals has succeeded in its endeavor to set clear guidelines for the circuit
courts in certification hearings. The Court should strive to define "reasonable-
ness" with more clarity so discovery related to certification issues is equally
clear.
C. Things Could Always be Worse
Even after the decision in Rezulin, part of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals still feels the circuit courts has too much discretion in class
certification proceedings. In Ways v. Imation Corporation,167 the Supreme
Court of Appeals upheld the order of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, de-
nying class certification to a group of former employees alleging breach of con-
tract and race, gender, and age discrimination in violation of the West Virginia
Human Rights Act.1
68
163 See Geoffrey E. Parmer, What "Erin Brockovich" Failed To Tell You About The Realities Of
Class Action Litigation, 57 J. DisP. RESOL. 19 (2002). Another author suggests that plaintiffs
should draft requests for production in a manner that merits discovery must be included in the
responses. See Susan Getzendanner, Class Certification Discovery, 15 LITIG. 25, Fall, 1988;
Parmer, supra, at 22 ("Courts have consistently held that the issue of what constitutes merits dis-
covery versus class certification discovery is not clear-cut, and documents inevitably fall into both
categories.").
164 See KLONOFF, supra note 70, at 98-99; see also Parmer, supra note 163, at 19. Another
author suggests that plaintiffs should draft requests for production in a manner that merits discov-
ery must be included in the responses. See Susan Getzendanner, Class Certification Discovery, 15
LITIG. 25, Fall, 1988; Parmer, supra note 163, at 22 ("Courts have consistently held that the issue
of what constitutes merits discovery versus class certification discovery is not clear-cut, and
documents inevitably fall into both categories.").
165 See, e.g., CLECKLEY, DAVIS & PALMER, supra note 3, at 474.
166 Id.
167 589 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 2003).
168 Id. at 47.
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While the majority in this per curiam opinion found that the circuit
court was correct in its determination, that the class did not meet Rule 23(a)'s
requirements of commonality and typicality, Justice McGraw disagreed. 169 In
his dissent he thought that the threshold of commonality under 23(a)(2) should
be even lower than the Court set forth in Rezulin and that the circuit court erred
in denying certification.1
7 0
Whether Justice McGraw is correct in urging the court to adopt a lower
threshold for commonality and typicality is reserved for another day. Suffice it
to say he desired to reverse the circuit court's order denying certification.
Thankfully, the majority did not allow the circuit court's discretion to be injured
any further by overturning it on another occasion. The majority in Ways found
that that the Circuit Court of Jefferson County correctly concluded that indi-
vidualized evidence relating to the existence of a valid contract of continued
employment raised issues that were not appropriate for treatment under (a)(2)
and (a)(3).
171
D. The Big Picture
After examining the recent decisions of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, a general observation is that circuit courts are not receiving
enough deference as to whether class certification is appropriate. Although the
court of appeals makes a valid argument that it is interpreting the law de novo in
Rezulin, its failure to show the Circuit Court of Raleigh County any deference
could be an abuse of power. This reasoning is supported by the Love court's
refusal to show any deference to the Circuit Court of Fayette County, despite the
fact that the class representative failed to adequately protect the interests of the
class. 172 Subsequently in Ways, the supreme court of appeals showed the Cir-
cuit Court of Jefferson County more discretion than it previously had in Love
and Rezulin. The court should continue this route in the future and not under-
mine the significant role the circuit court plays in the certification process by
overturning reasonable and rational decisions.
IV. THE AMBIGUOUS: A SECOND LOOK AT REZULIN
On the face of Rezulin it appears that the Supreme Court of Appeals has
dually certified the class of Rezulin plaintiffs under both 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). 
173
169 Ways, 589 S.E.2d at 47-48 (McGraw, J., dissenting).
170 See id. (McGraw, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 47.
172 See supra Part III.B.
173 Dual certification is strongly discouraged by virtually every commentator, as well as courts.
Most suits that qualify as class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2),
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The problem with the appearance of dual certification should be evident after
reading the Federal Practice and Procedure treatise, which suggests that:
will also qualify under the more comprehensive demands of 23(b)(3). When
either Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) is applicable, however, Rule 23(b)(3)
should not be used; in order to avoid unnecessary inconsistencies and com-
promises in future litigation.
CLECKLEY, DAVIS & PALMER, supra note 3, at 458 (citations omitted).
When a class action may qualify under Rule 23(b)(3) as well as 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), it is necessary
to specify the particular provision of the rule under which it is certified. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, supra note 13, at 217. Members of a (b)(3) class are entitled to notice and an opportu-
nity to opt out. See id. Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not mandate such notice and opportunity.
See id
It is not surprising that starting from a common base, a proposed class action may often qualify
under two or all three functional class categories, which considerably overlap. Of the three subdi-
visions, Rule 23(b)(3) is the most comprehensive. Some commentators have suggested that the
Rule 23(b)(3) type encompasses all class actions, and that Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions
represent specialized categories where class actions have been found particularly appropriate. See
2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 22, at § 4:1.
It is not usual for a case to qualify as more than one of the three types of class actions listed under
Rule 23(b)(3). See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.40[2] (Mat-
thew Bender 3d ed. 2004). If a choice exists, a mandatory class action is preferable because there
is not risk that individual members will opt out of the class and pursue separate litigation that
might prejudice other class members or the defendant. See id at 23.40[3].
The origination of the objection to dual certification under (b)(2) and (b)(3) can be traced back to
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), which was decided shortly after the
new version of Rule 23 replaced the older version of the Rule with its "true, hybrid, and spurious"
classifications. See supra note 70 and accompanying text for a discussion of old Rule 23. Ad-
dressing the issue of certification under 23(b), the Van Gemert court stated
[i]t seems apparent that virtually every class action that meets the requirements
of 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) will also meet the less severe requirements of 23(b)(3)..
. To apply 23(b)(3) [where certification under (b)(1) or (b)(2) was appropriate]
would run the serious risk of negating the very purpose for which those rules
were promulgated.
Van Gemert, 259 F. Supp. at 130-31.
The Van Gemert court also looked to the 1966 Advisory Committee notes for guidance and con-
cluded that (b)(3) was not designed for use where either (b)(l) or (b)(2) was applicable. Id. The
District Court for the Middle District of Florida cited Van Gemart, and stated,
It may be argued that the class action in this case could have been maintained
under Rule 23(b)(3) and that may be so. However, as noted above, this suit was
clearly maintainable under other sections of the rule. 'When such options are
available, the Court should treat the action as one under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2)
instead of under (b)(3) in order to achieve the purposes of the Rule which are to
avoid a multiplicity of suits, provide common binding adjudication, and prevent
inconsistent or varying adjudications.'
Mugin v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 720, 730 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
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Although it should make little difference which portion of Rule
23(b) applies to a particular case, the overlap does have signifi-
cance when both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) are applicable
because the type of notice required .. and the ability of a class
member to exclude himself from the judgment will depend on
which subdivision is deemed controlling. If the court deter-
mines that both provisions apply, then it should treat the suit as
having been brought under Rule 23(b)(2) so that all the class
members will be bound. To hold otherwise would allow the
members to utilize the opting out provision in subdivision (c)(2),
which in some cases would thwart the objectives of representa-
tive suits under Rule 23(b)(2). 1
74
Although the supreme court of appeals did certify two classes of
Rezulin users under two separate provisions of Rule 23, a medical monitoring
class under 23(b)(2) and a personal injury class under 23(b)(3), it certified two
distinct, separate classes.1 5 This is a technically a "hybrid certification"' 176 with
an injunctive and declaratory relief first stage without the right to opt-out 177 and
a second relief stage under 23(b)(3), in which class members have opt-out
rights.'1 8 The problem is that one cannot derive this information from the
court's opinion.179
Specifically in regards to the 23(b)(2) certification, the court stated,
"We find that under Rule 23(b)(2), after liability has been established, a court
may exercise its equitable powers to establish and administer a court-supervised
medical monitoring program to oversee and direct medical surveillance, and
provide for medical examinations and testing of members of a class."1 80 Re-
garding 23(b)(3) certification it stated, "[a]s we perceive the existing record, a
class action appears to be a superior method to any other method for expedi-
tiously litigating the claims of the parties."' 81 "The plaintiffs have therefore met
174 7A WRIGHT, supra note 104, at § 1775 (emphasis added).
17 In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003),
176 Hybrid certification occurs where equitable claims for relief are certified under (b)(2) and
damage claims are evaluated under (b)(3). See 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 22, at § 4:14.
177 "In contrast to Rule 23(b)(3) classes, Rule 23 does not mandate notice in (b)(2) actions that
a class has been certified and does not give class members a right to "opt out" of the class."
KLONOFF, supra note 70, at 68 (1999).
178 See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT
988-89 (2000).
179 This information became apparent after speaking to lawyers, both for the plaintiffs and the
defendants, involved in the Rezulin litigation.
180 In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 71 (W. Va. 2003).
181 Id. at 76.
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the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), and the circuit court erred in holding other-
wise."
d8 2
The unintended result of this language may result in Rezulin being in-
terpreted by other courts or attorneys in two ways:
(1) permitting (b)(2) class members the right to opt-out to
pursue separate litigation, a result never intended by the Advi-
sory Committee on FRCP 23, or
(2) requiring costly notice to (b)(2) class members that
could potentially cripple many (b)(2) classes.
Generally, classes under 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are not subject to notice and
opt-out requirements, 18 3 whereas (b)(3) class members are entitled to "the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort."' 184 The notice must
"advise each member that the court will exclude the member from the class if
the member so requests by a specified date." 185  If Rezulin is interpreted
wrongly to require notice to (b)(2) classes, or opt-out rights, class actions under
this provision will be severely impaired.
By not setting forth any guidelines for either notice or opt-out rights, the
West Virginia Court created confusion. The next time the Court considers is-
sues related to class certification it must clarify the following: (1) that In re West
Virginia Rezulin Cases does not authorize dual certification, (2) that notice is
generally not required in (b)(2) classes, and (3) that (b)(2) class members are not
permitted to opt-out absent court approval. The Court cannot reasonably expect
lawyers to simply know these points after reading the ambiguous Rezulin opin-
ion.
A partial "quick fix" would occur if the Court adopts the recently
amended version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Advisory Commit-
tee Notes for the new Rule 23 provide that if a 23(b)(3) class is certified in con-
junction with a (b)(2) class the notice requirements must conform with
23(c)(2)(B).) 8 However, the uncertainty concerning the right to opt-out of
182 Id.
183 A leading commentator in class actions states, "(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not by their terms allow
for opt-outs ... when only non-monetary relief is sought . . . [n]onetheless, courts generally hold
that trial courts have discretion under Rule 23(d)(5) to permit opt outs." KLONOFF, supra note 70,
at 126-36.
184 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
185 Id.
186 The New Federal Rule 23(c), effective December 1, 2003 provides:
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(b)(2) classes would remain. Therefore, the Court needs to address the ambigui-
ties it created in Rezulin regardless of whether it amends Rule 23 in the future.
This point should not be read as an endorsement for West Virginia's adoption of
(c) Determining by Order Whether to Certify a Class Action; Appointing
Class Counsel; Notice and Membership in Class; Judgment; Multiple Classes
and Subclasses.
(1)(A) When a person sues or is sued as a representative of a class, the
court must--at an early practicable time--determine by order whether to
certify the action as a class action.
(B) An order certifying a class action must define the class and
the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel un-
der Rule 23(g).
(C) An order under Rule 23(c)(1) may be altered or amended before
final judgment.
(2)(A) For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), the court may
direct appropriate notice to the class.
(B) For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct
to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances, in-
cluding individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain,
easily understood language:
-the nature of the action,
-the definition of the class certified,
-the class claims, issues, or defenses,
-that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the
member so desires,
-that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests
exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded,
and
-the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule
23(c)(3).
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivi-
sion (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was di-
rected, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be di-
vided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provi-
sions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
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the amended federal rule. Although the amended Rule has many advantages, it
may give courts too much involvement in the settlement process.187
V. CONCLUSION
As an old song goes, "You've come a long way baby ... [but] You've
still got a way to go." 18s Although the song was not about West Virginia's class
action jurisprudence, it certainly applies. After studying the evolution of Rule
23 in West Virginia, it is apparent that the court has improved West Virginia's
class action device, but it is still far from what it should be.
But, "what it should be" is very subjective. A perfect model to one may
be grossly inadequate to another. Nevertheless, if the court follows the critique
set forth in this Note, continues to set forth clear, concise standards as pointed
out in Part II, strives to exercise the appropriate scope of appellate review as
discussed in Part III, and refrains from creating confusion, as demonstrated in
Part IV, the result should be a more functional and satisfactory Rule 23.
Brad Dorsey*
187 See David Bryce Barber, New Federal Class Rules Empower Courts, 29 LITIGATION NEWS
2, January, 2004.
188 Josie and the Pussycats (1970), lyrics available at http://www.stlyrics.com/songs/j/
josieandthepussycats2081/youvecomealongwaybaby1001 82.html
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